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AUTHORISED PERFORMANCES: THE
PROCEDURAL SOURCES OF
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
RICHARD MOHRt
I SALIENCE AND CRITERIA OF JUDICIAL
AUTHORlTY
Media criticism of the courts, or perceptions of a declining 'public confidence' in
the judiciary have led to concems over law's authority. There has been dcbate on
concems over 'judicial activism' in North and South America, Europe and
Australia. I In Australia this has been played out in political criticism of the judges
of the High Coun, while other courts have come in for criticism from sections of
the media for being too lenient in sentencing and generally being' soft on crime'.2
Judicial concern over these criticisms has been expressed in extra-curial responses
by High Court judges3 and in several recent conferences focussing on public
perceptions and media representations of the judiciary. Two of these conferences
were organised by judicial bodies and all were well attended by judges.4 Judicial
concern over limits and challenges to judicial authority has also been apparent in a
number of cases addressing judicial powers. 5
In light of these legal issues, political events and judicial responses, it is
timely to consider the nature and sources of judicial authority. In order to
understand the potential for these events to seriously threaten or erode judicial
authority, we need to understand what that authority rests on. Is the authority of
t Faculty of Law, University ofWollongong, Australia 2522. rick_ffiohr@uow.edu.au.
I am grateful to Margaret Davies for val uable comments on a draft of this paper and to Jiri Priban
for challenging and stimulating many of [he ideas thal led to it.
Boavemura de Sousa Santos, 'The GATT of Law and Democracy: (Mis)Trusting the Global
Reform of Courts' in Johanncs Feesl (ed), Globalization and Legal Cultures (1999);
Carlo Guamieri, Magistratura e Poliliea in !lalia (1992); Kcnneth Holland (ed), JudiCial Activism
in Comparative Per.lpective (1991); C Neal Tate and Torbjom Vallinder (eds), The Global
Expansion oJJudicial Power (1995).
2 RusseJJ Hogg and David Brown, Relhinking Law and Order (1998),29-34.
3 Sir Gerard Brennan, 'The Slate of rhe Judicature' (Paper presented at 30th Australian Legal
Convemion, Melboume, 19 September 1997); Justice Mi.chad Kirby, 'Teaching Australians
Civics' (Paper presented ar Queensland University of Technology, Faculty of Law Dinner,
Brisbane, 15 August 1997).
4 Judicial Conference of Australia, Sydney, November J997; Australian Instirutc of Judicial
Administration, Melbourne, September 1998; Couns and the Media, University of Technology,
Sydney, November 1998.
5 See, eg, Grolio vPalmeJ' (1995) 184 CLR 348; Wilson v Minister Jor Aboriginal and Ton'es
Straightlslander A;!airs (1996] 138 ALR 220.
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the judge dependent on the backing of the smte? Does it rest on public opinion, or
'public trust and confidence',6 or some other popular source? Or does it inhere in
the procedures of the court? Is judicial authority based in the formal and rational
attributes of the law itself or in some other concepts of faimess? The nature of any
threats to judicial authority and the suitability of any responses would depend
upon the answers to these and related questions.
Before considering the range of possible foundations ofjudicial authority, it is
necessary to consider what criteria should be applied in considering the extent of
that authority. To that end we need to consider the nature of authority and its place
in the polity and the rule of law. Authority may be seen in the difference between
naked power, a political power which would need to assert itself by continual
threat of force, and power which is accepted as valid, right or legitimate. This
definition of authority suggests two fundamental criteria. Authority must be
accepted, which raises the question, 'by whom?'. And it must be valid, which
raises the question of\vhat constitutes legitimacy.
Each of these questions must be addressed at a different level. The question of
acceptance could be posed as an empirical question, answered by opinion polls.
This may tell us something about what various proportions of people think (or
accept). Yet it may be objected that this would not tell us anything about those
decidedly               concepts of right or validity, to which legitimacy points.
These are properly the realm of political or moral philosophy or jurisprudence. To
seek the sources ofjudicial authority in opinion, whether the opinion of the whole
population or of some influential subset, also has the disadvantage that it assumes
the answer. Judicial authority may have its source in public opinion, but we will
not discover whether or not this is the case by canvassing opinion by means of
polls.
There is no necessary relationship between empirical measures of opinion or
preference and the requirement of validity. BayIes points out that 'voluntary
agreement to a procedure' tells us nothing about the justice of that procedure. 7
While voluntary participation may be one among other procedural principles, the
analysis of choice does not assist in understanding the binding authority of the
judge.
Legal authority is domination based upon a set of rational rules. 'Obedience is
thus given to the norms rather than to the person.,B Legitimacy is validity
detemlined by a legal order, when its rules (and their application, in the case of
judicial authority) are made within that legal order.9 In these definitions proposed
by. Weber and Kelsen we find that authority rests in a system of ru ]es or a legal
6 Brendan Condie et ai, Client Services in Local Cowts: Standards and Benchmarks (1996) 21;
Commission on Trial CoUT! Performance Smndards, Trial Court Perfhrmance StundLlrd.l'
(1990) 20.
7 Michae1 Baylcs, Procedural Justice: Allocating to Individuals (1990) 6.
8 Max Weber, Economy and Sociery: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (German 4th cd, 1956;
English translalion, 1978) 954.
9 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (first published as Reine Rechtslehre, 1934; English
translalion, 1967) 34, passim.
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order. In an inquiry imo an aspect of law, this raises concerns over the possibility
of circularity. Inquiring imo the authority of judges, we meet that circularity as
soon as we ask, of any particular decision, 'who decides the law?' To the extent
that rhe law is what the judges say it is, judicial authority resting purely on law
raises as many questions as it anSwers. To gaLlge judicial authority based on
criteria of legal validity would require an independent assessment of their
lawfulness which would have to stand outside the law of the judges. This is not my
intention.
Against the suggestion that judicial authority should be measured by its legal
validity, I have raised the concern that this does not offer any independent measure
other than the law that the judge is to pronounce. On the other hand, the opinion of
the public provides no measure of authority, but only of popularity. Luhmann
distinguishes between investigating 'law' and investigating 'opinions about law'.
The limitation of opinion studies in relation to authority is that they tell us how
questions are answered in the course of research, but not about 'the readiness to
act'. 10 In keeping with Luhmann's view that judicial authority operates as a means
of 'processing disappointment', the requirement of compliance with the judicial
decision is paramount. This is indicated by the enforceability of the decision, not
the satisfaction of either party with their experience. Certainly, the decision is to
be complied with voluntarily if possible. Yet we need other means for
understanding the legitimacy of judicial authority.
These points lead to a third possible measure of judicial authority: that of
efficacy. \Vhile Luhmann proposes that public acceptance of authority is besr
indicated by the readiness to act, Kelsen notes that legitimacy is limited by
efficacy. For a nonn, or a legal order, to be legitimate it must be effective as well
as valid. Even though the validiry of a legal order ultimately rests on the basic
norm, it 'can no longer be regarded as valid when [it] cease[s] to be effective.' 11 In
the absence of a foundational faith in the basic nom1, r propose adopting, as a
criterion of the presence or absence of judicial authority, the criterion of efficacy.
That is to say, we may identify judicial authority to the extent that is effective.
This is not a classical jurisprudential question, since we are not inquiring into its
legal or philosophical foundation. Nor is it exactly an empirical question, of the
type addressed by a public opinion poll. The criterion of efficacy has rhe
advantage that it avoids judging the judges using a legal yardstick, while offering a
stronger test of authority than could be deduced from an empirical study of public
opinion,
10 Niklas Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law (German, 1972; English translation, 1985) 4.
Luhmann's theories of procedure as a source oflegitimalion arc discussed in some detail in this
work (pp 202ft). As a precursor to the work of John Rawls and stimulus to ThaL of
Jurgen Habermas, both of which are considered below, Luhmann's role as author of LegiJimation
durch Ver/ohren (1969) muSl be acknowledged hcre. However his approach is so different that it
requires fuller investigation, with a different focus.
I I Kelsen, above n 9, 212. Max Knight's traJ,ls1ation refers to 'effectiveness'; I follow Varga and
Priban in using the krm 'efficacy'. See Csaba Varga, The Place of Law in LukiJcs' World
CO/lcepJ (1985) 137; Jiri Priban, 'Beyond Procedural Legitimation; Legality and lIs "lnfictions'"
(1997) 24 Joumal ofLem. and Society 331,331.
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Inquiring into the efficacy ofjudicial authority means asking whether it v,"orks.
To this end we would \vant to know whether the judicial pronouncement takes
effect in the court and the world outside the court. Does it make a difference? To
address the efficacy of judicial authority is to ask whether it brings into existence
conditions which would not oTherwise exist. 'Validity is an organizing principle
within the legal complex and efficacy is what becomes ontologically existent in
the actual process of mediation [between legal and other social systems].' 12
Following Varga, this approach IQ the criteria of judicial authority may be seen as
neither an empirical nor a legal, but an ontological one.
Let me sum up the terms of the inquiry as I have developed them to this point.
Importam legal and poliTical implications follow from the existence of judicial
authority. To inquire into the sources of this authority, we first must agree on the
criteria which we would apply to identify it. I have suggested that there are three
forms of criteria: empirical criteria, such as public opinion; legal criteria, or the
legality of judicial actions; and ontological criteria, or the efficacy of the judicial
pronouncement. Since the purpose of this inquiry is to discover the sources of
judicial authority, it is important to avoid any criteria which foreclose or prejudge
the findings. Legal criteria do just that since they unambiguously locaTe authority
in law and its correct application. Empirical criteria deriving from public opinion
fail to give us any purchase on the notion of legitimacy or validity. Such a populist
teST may offer some indications of preferred sources or styles of authority, but is
unconvincing as a test of authority. And in the same way as legal criteria foreclose
the question by assuming the answer lies in the law, empirical criteria forcclose iT
by assuming the answer lies in the people, or in whatever segment of the
population one were to survey.
Instead I have adoptcd the ontological criterion, which tells us that judicial
authority can be identified to the extem that the judge's decision is put into effect.
That is to say, judicial authority exists to the extent that judicial pronouncements
are effective in creating conditions in court and outside it. The conditions of
judicial efficacy are not only indicated by compliance with final judicial
detenninations beyond the courtroom walls, but include all those directions and
decisions that the judge makes in the course of trials, or other hearings. Judicial
decisions are authoritative when they bind people to their enforcement, whether
they concern the admissibility of evidence, the sentencing of an offender or the
detennination of a major land rights case. The important question for this inquiry
is: what are the sources of the judicial authority which has these effects?
TIw sources of judicial authority may be external to the judicial function or
they may be internal to it. I use the term 'jUdicial function' rather than 'law' here
because, as will become clearer, I see the activities of the judge as including 'the
law' (in a narrow sense) as well as a potentially wider range of actions which may
not be so easy to characterise. I will return to these.
12 Varga, above n 11, 137. Given the difficulties in KeIsen's notion of validity resting on the basic
norm, Varga's subordination of 'validity' to 'etDc:lcy' is a valuable methodological device.
However, it is less, atrracrive politically, as will be discussed in more detail when considering
Carl Schmirt, below.
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As discussed, 'the people' (or one might say popular will) is one possible
external source of judicial authority. What other contenders are there'? The state
clearly plays a part in underwriting judicial authority, so it must be considered as
another possible external source. When we come to look in more detail at the
judicial function, it will be clear that the actions of the judge continuously
constitute judicial authority. We must then ask how it is that the judge can
constitute his or her own authority, relying upon what sources.
The judicial function relies on the law as 'a system of consciously made
rational rules', 13 as one possible internal source of authority. Further analysis will
allow us to identify the actions and context which are necessary for the enactment
of those rules. These need to be carried out within a legal (or at least not illegal)
framework, and include a range of factors which may be codified to some extent
as 'procedure', but include other elements which are not included within those
'consciously made rational rules'. These include the judge's perfoffi1ative
utterance and the conditions which authorise it, as well as the ritual elements of
court procedure, including those covered by procedural rules as well as those
which may fall outside any legal code.
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IT THE STATE
The efficacy ofjudicial authority is backed by the power of the state. To the extent
that the state enforces judicial decisions, particularly in the criminal law, it may
appear that the stare underwrites the authority of the judge. Here we must be
cautious about a tenn such as efficacy, and recall that we are looking nor at power
but at authority. While power may be effective in applying the physical force
necessary to detain someone convicted by a judge, this is nOt an exercise of
authority. State implementation of judicial decisions reflects the state's respect for
the authority of the judge, but it institutes power, not authority.
lfwe follow Weber's formulation on legitimacy, we see that the boot is on the
other fooL Authority is legitimate domination, and the legitimacy of the state is
detern1ined by 'formal legality' .14 Given its basis in the fonnal system of law, the
authority of the Stale depends upon the authority of the judge. In politico-legal
tenns the doctrine of the separation of powers is intended to avoid disputes over
authority, notably those between a popular legislature and the judiciary. From a
sociological perspective, however, the doctTine raises more issues than it resolves.
The separation of powers has been a remarkably tenacious ideology since it was
proclaimed by Montesquieu a quarter of a millennium ago and subsequently
entrenched, alluded to, or fudged in any number of constitutions.
Important critiques, from both left and right which arose in the early twentieth
century, are illuminating. Gramsci saw the doctrine of the separation of powers as
13 Weber, above n 8,954 (emphasis in original].
14 Ibid216.
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an elaborate ideological construction for thc interpretation and justification of
legal and political arrangements. He saw the doctrine as encapsulating the entire
liberal ideology, and so it was paliicularly significant in supporting the continued
legitimacy of liberal regimes.
It is to be nOled how lapses in the administration of justice make an especially
disastTous impression on the pUblic: the hegemonic apparatus is more sensitive in
lhis secwr, w which arbitrary actions on the part of the police and political
administration may also be referred. 15
While Gramsci was wrlling these words as a prisoner of Fascist Italy, Schmitt was
supporting the rise of Nazism in Gem1any. Gramsci's materialist debunkingof the
doctrine highlighted its nan'ow frame and historical specificity. Ifit arose out of
the interests of a specific class in a particular historical moment, the separation of
powers could hardly be seen as the perpetual guarantor of good government.
Schmitt's critique was potentially more damaging. In his enquiry into sovereignty,
which he defined as the po\ver to decide the exception, Schmitt placed the power
of the state above the legitimacy of the law. The notion of sovereignty is founded
in the personality of the monarch and its power cannot be negatcd by asserting that
law's right trumps the state's might. Schmitt thus took Kelsen's point, that validity
is limited by efficacy, to its logical conclusion: the validity of legal right is
overwhelmed, at tl10se crucial moments when it really counts, by sovereign power.
The sleight of hand by which the modern law-giver is thought to be 'omnipotent'
is revealed not only in the theological origins of such an expression, but, more
damagingly, in the ultimate power which resides in the state.
The connection of actual power with the legally highest power is the fundamemaJ
problem of the concept of sovereignty. All the difficulties reside here. In
The state and the judiciary are mutually dependent on each other's authority, and
the judiciary is dependent on the state's use of force. Taken together these facts
point to the serious difficulty facing the judiciary in any attempt to rely on the state
for authority. The very fact that the judiciary relies on state power indicates the
.unreliability of the state as a source of authority. And, as Gramsci pointed out, the
state's reliance on the judiciary as a source of legitimacy makes the rclationship
between the state and the judiciary threatening to the legitimacy of both. The
separation of powers doctrine, administered by the judiciary, is crucial to this
legitimacy.
IH THE PEOPLE
We are well accustomed to that democratic theory which sees the people as the
source of authority, Consequently it seems obvious that we should consider this as
a possible source of judicial aLlthority. However credible this theory may be in
relation to the democratic state and its elected governments, there are major
arguments against this view in the case of the legal authority of the judiciary. One
of these arguments follows on from the above conclusion that the separation of
15 Amonio Gramsci, Seleclionsfimn the Prison Notebooks ofGramsci (1971) 246.
16 Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept                (1985) 18.
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17 Elizabeth Handsley, 'Public Confidence in the Judiciary: A Red Hening for the Separation of
Judicial Power' (1998) 20 Sydney Lmv Review 183.
18 Ibid 214.
19 Agnes I-Ieller, 'The Complexity of Justice (a Challenge to rhe Twenty-First Century)' (1996) 9
RalioJuris 138, 138_
20 lbid 138.
21 Ibid ]43_
22 [bid 144_
powers doctrine is a source of the legitimacy of the state as well as of the
judiciary. The other derives from political philosophy, and distinguishes the rule of
law from democracy as a source of legitimacy. These both constitute strong
arguments against a popular source ofjudicial authority, and I will consider them
before turning to alternaTive views. I rely on t\vo recent pertinent statements of
these arguments.
The legal argument which insists on differentiating judicial authori,y from
popular sources has been succinctly stated in a discussion of a number of recent
judgments of the High Court of Australia relating to judicial powers. 17 Noting a
number of judicial references to public perceptions of the judiciary, Handsley
criticises the presumption that the place of the judiciary is to be detem1ined, at
least in large measure, by public opinion or 'ephemeral perception'. Worse still is
the presumption ofjudges to make these decisions on thc basis of their attempts to
second guess public opinion, while having 'no evidence as to the effect of a
particular arrangement on public perceptions of the judiciary' .IS Handsley's
defence of an independent role for the judiciary is based in the constitutional
separation of powers and a democratic theory of law emphasising the distinction
between judicial and electoral responsibilities.
The political philosophy argument sees democracy and legal principles as two
foundational versions of contemporary legitimacy which must balance each other.
In the modem liberal Slate fundamental legal principles are based in liberalism.
While proposing that 'the combination of liberalism and democracy' is 'the
greatest single invention in modem politics', 19 Hel1er sees such difficulties in this
balance that she suggests that the 'tension between liberalism and democracy is
very likely to become one ofthe major conflictual fields of the early nventy-first
century' .20 NOling that equality is the central value of democracy, she points out
how many decisions which rely on this value could have the effect of working
against the liberties of particular groups, including cultural elites or immigrantS.
This derives from the second aspect of the democratic ethos, which is the principle
thar the majority is always right. Thus the political ideal of equality is translated
into a quasi-epistemological principle, reinforcing the moral power of the majority
to make judgemems or decisions for all members of the polityY Liberalism, with
its emphasis on independent thought, is clearly inconsistent with this view.
Beyond this, ,he Iiberal notion of rights sets standards of freedom for individuals
and minorities which may well be ar odds with majority views.22
It is not hard to see parallels between the clash of liberal and democratic
values and the conflicts facing Australian judges as they try to uphold legal
RICI-LA.RD MOl-iR4 FJLR 63]
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principles while maintaining public trust and confidence, particularly where that is
interpreted as public popularity. If decision making were to be based on
majoritarian principles, decided by referenda rather than law and judges, there
would be quite differem outcomes in many cases. So the people cannot be the
source of judicial authoriry in any sense as direct as one which decides outcomes
or pits the views of the majority against the decisions ofjudges.
HelIer sees contemporary efforts to formalise liberalism moving from reliance
on rights to a reliance (following Rawls) on procedureY If the content of popular
decisions were to be so different from that of judicial decisions, we may have to
retreat to a position that rested on the appropriate procedures to follow in making
these decisions.
This is just the position that we find in I-Iabermas's discourse theory which
founds political legitimacy in the means of communicative action, including all
those procedures which purport to ensure participation in decision making. The
people, excluded from authorising judicial authority substantively, as decision
makers, or through their opinion of the judiciary or of any particular decision,
re-emerge through the medium of public reason based in communicative action.
'[P]opular sovereignty withdraws into democratic procedures and the demanding
communicative presuppositions of their implementation. '24
However, the attempt to resolve conflicts over outcomes by consensus on
procedures raises the question of the appropriate procedures to follow. The
following consideration ofprocedures must inquire whether there is any conflict
between popular and judicial procedures, just as HelIer suggests a conflict between
popular and j udicial decisions.
IV PROCEDURE
The interaction of the rational, codified law and the physical presence of the judge
(discussed at section V, below) suggests that the impersonal law is inadequate to
constitute judicial authority, but requires the judicial presence. The simple
observation that there can be no trial without a judge leads to a number of
questions about the role of the judge and the context in which judicial authority is
invoked. This context includes the courtroom setting and the roles of other
participants in the trial. Many of these issues fall under the category of
'procedure'. We must now distinguish several uses of this term, embedded as it is
in any number oflegal and sociological theories.
'Procedure', as discussed in legal and curial debates, normally refers to such
formal minutiae as discovery, the fomls used to specify causes and matters in
dispute and adjournment policies. Of equal social importance are those procedures
23 Ibid 145.
24 Jiirgen I-Iabermas, Between FaCls and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory ofLaw and
Democracy (German, 1992; English translation, 1996) 486.
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which detennine where cases will be held, how the court will be physically
arranged, how it will use what technology, and how the public may become aware
of the proceedings. No evidence may be admirted unless by authority of the judge.
The tTial itself cannot proceed unless the judge detennines that the court has
jurisdiction. The trial is constructed out of numerous decisions about how to
proceed, timing, interim orders, admissibility, discovery and so on. These
'interlocutory' decisions mark out the boundaries of the case and constitute
'meta-stories' out of 'the opposing stories of the parties involved' .2.1 In this way
the judge is continually constituting the institution of the court throughout a triaL26
It may seem commonplace to suggest that procedures of this type have critical
importance in the public perception of the judiciary: they even detennine, quite
literally, how the public will (or will not) see the judge. Adopting efficacy as the
criterion of judicial authority leads us to ask what it is that these procedural
devices accomplish. Law, jurisprudence and the social sciences have developed
divergent theoretical approaches to procedure.
Unlike the United States, where the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
contain 'due process' clauses, Australia has no such constitutional provisions.
Apart from some references to United States provisions,27 Australian courts have
generally held that there is little general content to any procedural requirements,
beyond the Constitution's s 80 reference to trial by jury and vague statutory
requirements that 'only in common law courts should persons be tried for crimes
and only by recognized procedures. ,28 A number of specific matters may constitute
grounds for appeaL Extensive as these may be they do not add up to a general
specification ofprocedural requirements or due process:
There has been no judieiClI attempT to list exhaUSTively the attributes of a fair trial.
That is because, in the ordinary course of the criminal appellate process, an
appellate eourt is generally called upon to detemline, as here, whether something
that was done or said in the eourse of the trial, or less usually before trial ...
resulted in the aceused being deprived of a fair trial and led to a miscarriage of
justice. 29
While legal theories of procedure tend to concentrate on classification30 of
procedural issues or comparison3 ! of procedural regimes, it is in jurisprudence and
social science that we find analysis of direct relevance to the present inquiry.
Several of these approaches offer valuable, if mutually conflicting, insights into
the role of procedure in legitimising judicial authority.
In the English speaking world the notion of 'procedural justice' is usually
25 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Evel)'day Life (firsl published as Arts de Faire, [1984];
English lranslation, 1984) 122.
26 Csaba Varga, Theory ofthe Judicial Process: The Establishment ofFacts (1995) 132-34.
27 Notably Gaudron J in Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292,371.
28 Ibid 307 (Mason CJ and MeHugh J), on the intent of the Imperial Acts Application Act 1980
(Vie).
29 Ibid 300 (Mason CJ and McHugh J).
30 Robert Millar, 'The Formative Principles ofCivil Procedure' (1923-24) 18111inois LID" Review I.
31 J A Jolowicz, 'The Active Role of the Court in Civil Litigation' in Mauro Cappelletti and
Jolowicz (eds), Public Interest Parties and the Active Role ofthe Judge in Civil Litigation (1975).
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associated with Rawls's The07Y ofJustice. Postulating an original position from
which one could derive mechanisms of justice with universal applicability, Rawls
proposed procedures which he called 'pure', 'perfect' and 'imperfect' procedural
justice.32 Although he identified the actual conduct of trials with 'imperfect
procedural justice', the very idea that procedure could form a basis of justice was
to lead to several fruitful lines of inquiry. These are, broadly, philosophical and
empiricaL Philosophers have used procedural principles to argue for universally
valid ways ofmaking decisions and solving disputes.}3 Empirical research has, on
the other hand, investigated the types of procedures which elicit the greatest
acceptance, or which have 'consequences for evaluations of authorities and
institmions ' .34
I have referred above to Habermas's notes on the relationship ofprocedure to
popular sovereignty. Turning to judicial procedure, wc see that he has also
specified a range of requirements for decision-making processes which can be
applied universally. These include a notion of discourse as a rational and fair mode
of argument, forgoing the use of force and seeking after truth.35 Communicative
action is not merely a description of the ways in which societies get things done: it
includes prescriptions for ethical life. 36 The ideal speech situation is both
efficacious and ethical. In common with traditions of public reason which
Habermas identified with the rise of the bourgeois public sphere, his
communicative action is based in a reason which transcends any individual
consciousness. In Habermas's turn to communicative action and the ethics of
discourse as sources of social right we discover the power of procedure in the
economy of legitimation. Decisions are just to the extent that they proceed from
just and rational communicative regimes.
Philosophers including Habermas and Rawls suggest there may be a minimum
ideal content for procedural fairness. Habermas's ideal speech situation is, like
Rawls's pure procedural juslice, so ideal that it bears little resemblance to the real
communication in a courtroom. But more recent work of Habennas or Bayles,'7
has greater programmatic content, to the extent that it could be used to evaluate
real procedural regimes, rather than simply playing a role as a Rousseauian
thought experiment.
This overview of procedure as a possible source ofjudicial authority suggests
a number of key points. In the absence of reliable and consensual sources of
substantive justice, philosophers have turned, particularly in the second half of the
twentieth century, to sources of procedural justice. Empirical studies have
identified opinions among disputants or potential litigants as to which fonns of
32 John Raw]s, A Theory 0/Justice (1972) 85.
33 Bay1es, above n 7 and Stuart Hampshire, Innocence and Experience (1989).
34 Stefan Machura, 'Introduclion:Procedural Justice, Law and Policy' (1998) 20Law and Policy 1,3.
Machura here provides a comprehensive overview of the work of E Allan Lind, Tom Ty!er,
John Thibault and Laurens Walker and Olhers.
35 JUrgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (German, 1973; English lranslation, J976) 107-8.
36 Jurgen Haberrnas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (German, 1983; English
translation, J990).
37 Haberrnas, above n 24, BayJes, above n 7.
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procedural justice are preferable. Yet the a priori studies seek a source other than
that of voluntary choice or public opinion. From the viewpoint of gauging the
efficacy of a procedure, it is imponant to understand the likelihood of compliance
and the source ofthat authority which compels compliance.
The principles of writers such as Habermas or Rawls operate in two ways in
constructing procedural authority. On the one hand, as discussed above, they
provide criteria for evaluating communicative competence or procedural justice.
They also constitute a language and narratives which we may apply in assessing
fairness. That language ofprocedural fairness may be used to interrogate particular
legal regimes. We may ask of them whether, for instance, all paIiies have equal
opportunities to be heard, whether the adjudicator is impartial, or whether
(following Habermas) 'all motives [are excluded] except that of the cooperative
search for truth' .38 If these criteria are central to our perceptions ofjustice, we may
expect judicial authority to benefit from conformity with such standards. But does
the authority of the judge really rely on these standards? Are they not somewhat
out ofline with people's expectations and experience ofjudicial procedures?
Even if the standards of procedural fairness are generally complied with in
typical Australian trials (and that is an empirical question), there remains a curious
surplus of procedure. By this I mean that to satisfy the criteria of impartiality,
opportunity to be heard, and the rest, requires certain minimal standards of
participation, of understanding and of independence. Yet in their actual operation,
the courts introduce additional procedures such as testing and admitting evidence,
and locating trials in the specific setting of the courtroom, with all its conventions
of design, dress and behaviour. Many such procedures seem not only to add little
to what I have called minimal standards, but in many cases they appear to work
against the requirements of ideal communication or procedural fairness. This is
particularly obvious in aspects of formality and tradition where the array of
perfonnative and ritual devices is simply inexplicable except as 'noise' in a system
dedicated to communication or fairness.
V PERFORlv1ATIVE AND RITUAL
A key source of the authority of the law is founded in its rational structure and
methods, so this suggests itself as an apparent source of impersonal authority on
which judges may rely. The judge applies a rational method, or draws on a rational
set of codes which are external to the judge, yet inrernal to the law. Looking
behind this simple formulation, we discover a number of complications which
arise in attempting to found judicial authority on the law as a rational system. One
obvious difficulty arises out of the judge's role as the source of law. As we delve
deeper into this objection, which is fairly simple on the surface, we find other
layers of difficulty.
38 Habcm1as, above n 35,108.
73
fLINDERS JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM [(2000)
If judicial authority were based in positive legal codes, then the judge would
have an exclusive responsibility to apply those codes conscientiously to each case.
This argument is implicit or explicit in calls for narrow judicial interpretations and
sensitivity to judicial activism or creativity. Without needing to rehearse the many
arguments of that debate, it is \vorth noting, here, some basic points about judicial
application of the law.
Even if the judge \vere merely a passive conduit through which the law
passed, the agency and presence of the judge would still be necessary to law's
application. Obvious as it is, this point leads to some important implications.
These apply both to the legal institution of the court and to judicial decisions,
neither ofwhich could exist nor have authority without the presence of the judge.
Firstly, on the institution, we can see that the judge does not enter the court
only at the moment of the written decision. Despite the well known passivity of
the judge in the adversarial system, the trial cannot proceed without the judge. The
judge must not only 'hear' the case, but must authorise its entTy to the court,
through the procedural devices discussed above.
When we come to the decision, which is to say the final decision which
concludes the case, we see other ways in which the simple presence of the judge is
essential to the authority borrowed from the law. Even if the decision, which 'adds
nothing, and it adds itself,'39 were nothing more nor less than the law, it could not
be made without the judge. The judge is the onc inescapable condition of the
decision. The judicial decision, as it is pronounced from the bench, is the critical
moment in law's authority. 'The constraint of enunciation, as a general constraint
of the existence of discourse, is JUSt precisely the constraint of juris-diction. ,40 In
this way Nancy takes the source of law back to its enunciation as a perfonnative.
And Baldus reminds us that the personal presence of the judge is fundamental
even to law's enunciation: 'wanting a person, Reason and Justice act nothing'. 41
Weber's theoretical attempt to base the authority of the liberal state in the
power of reason rather than that of the person encounters its greatest difficulty
here, in the judicial pronouncement. We see this in Schmitt's criticism: 'Because
the legal idea cannot realise itself, it needs a particular organisation and fOffi1
before it can be translated into reality.'42 Davies also draws attention to the
deliberative processes in exploring the place of the decision-makers and
procedures which say the law. With Schmitt, she discovers behind the appeal to
universality - whether positivist or rationalist - the performative which enacts
the law, 'a picture of law as a performance, not as a static set of norms. ,43 The
structure which is law in its own self-image exists nowhere but in its continual
renewal and reassertion in the perfom1ative of successive decisions.
39 Jean-Luc Nailcy, 'The Jurisdiction of the Hegelian Monarch' (1982) 49 Social Research
481,504.
40 Ibid 505.
41 Quoted, Ernst Kanlorowicz, The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology
er 957), 142.
42 Sc1unirt, above n 16,28_
43 Margarer Davies, Delimiting the Law: 'Postmodernism' and the Politics ofLaw (1996), 98.
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However fallible a judge may be, and however dependent upon the positive
law or the reasoning that SUppOltS it, without the judge there is no law. Under these
conditions judicial activism is of no relevance. The least activist judge goes
beyond the codified law, as is necessary, simply in order to convene a court, to
cause a trial to progress, or to pronounce a decision. By this circuitous path we
return IQ the enigma ofjudicial authority. It invokes the rational norms ofpositive
law, but finds these insufficient without the authority bestowed by the judicial
presence itself.
Jurisdiction, as Nancy reminds us, is sought in the saying of the law.44 Austin
called the utlerance which becomes law as it is spoken the 'performative'. Unlike
the constative, which may be judged true or false, the performative may work or it
may not: in Austin's terms it may be felicitous or infelicitous.45 Hence, in
examining the conditions of judicial authoriTY, the key question becomes: under
what conditions does judicial authority work, in the sense of being felicitous?
More critical still, under what conditions could it be infelicitous? And where is the
line between the two? \Ve may begin from Austin in exploring the conditions for
the felicitous judicial performative. Revealingly, and very helpfully, Austin is
acutely aware ofthe lisks to successful performance:
Speaking generally, it is always necessary that the circumstances in which ,he
words are uttered should be in some way, or ways, appropriate, and it is very
commonly necessary that either the speaker himself or other persons should also
perform certain other actions, whether 'physical' or 'mental' actions or even acts
of uttering further words:16
The context of the utterance is crucial. Performative language has the force of
action where the words are uttered within an accepted convention by those
authorised to utter them. Participants must adhere to the conventional procedure.
In the case of the judicial performative, the context seemS clear enough. The
proceedings should take place in a courtroom, except under such circumstances as
taking a view of a site, or accepting remote evidence by video. The correct form of
language should be adhered to, by the judge and by other participants, so as not to
risk a mistrial by admitting inadmissible evidence, or pronouncing an ambiguous
sentence. The person who pronounces a judicial decision must be a judge, unless
they are a magistrate or perhaps a master or registrar (under certain
circumstances). As in Austin's analysis, the exceptions and risks quickly
lllultiply.47
Some of these exceptions are covered by the law. If the correct procedure is
not fully executed, then there is provision for appeal, mistrial and setting judgment
aside. These are generally the infelicities which Austin classifies as
'misexecutions': 'the procedure is all right, and it does apply all right, but we muff
the execution of the ritual with more or less dire consequences'. 48 But we may still
44 Nancy, above n39, 50S.
45 J L Austin, How To Do Things With Words (first published 1962, 2nd cd, 1975), 12-14.
46 Ibid 8. Emphasis in originaL
47 Ibid 14-18.
48 Ibid 17.
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have a nagging doubt about what the correct procedure is, or whether it is
appropriate for these participants to enact it, or this judge to pronounce on it
('misinvQcations').
The use of performatives in an Australian court is marked by specific gestures
or set wording. Those moments when a perfonnative is to be uttered are signified
by the court'coming to order', in the demeanour of the lawyers, or the exh01iation
of a court officer. Apart from the solemn moment when the judge enterS or leaves
the court, and 'all stand', these are among the most highly charged rituals. The
most critical perfonnative moments in an Australian court occur when a witness is
sworn to 'tell the truth' and when the judge passes sentence. When a witness is
sworn to truthfulness, the court officer hands him or her a Bible, demands that the
court be silent, and utters the prescribed fom1 of words asking if the witness
swears 'by Almighty God'. The response, 'I do', is one of Austin's classic
perfom1atives. The witness is not, at this point, giving evidence (stating facts), but
is taking an oath, perfonning an act which asserts and obliges the truthfulness of
the subsequent evidence. The witness's account of the facts, signified or
'bracketed' by this perfom1ative, is then able to enter the cOllli as evidence, subject
to its admissibility according to the judge.
The moment at which the decision is announced is the critical point at \vhich
the deliberations of a rational system of law is translated into action in the world of
human affairs. In any court it is a moment of solemnity. The judge utters specific
fonns of words, making the decision legally clear and referring to the legal basis
of the decision. Even in the summary justice of the lower criminal courts, ,he
defendant is required to sIand and face the judge while being sentenced. In the
wordy decisions of the higher courts, the reasoning behind the judicial opinion is
given in ritualised fonns, as Brion has noted in regard to United States courtS.49
The court and its rituals constitute the context which lends authority to the
court's perfonnatives. A sociological response to Austin insists that he sees in
language what we should really be looking for in delegated authority or in ritual.
Bourdieu has responded to Austin that the power of the perfom1ative derives not
from the language but from the authority of the speaker. Habem13s, with Austin,
stands accused by Bourdieu of a fonnalism which attributes authority to speech
itself
The power of words is nothing other than the delegated power of the
spokesperson, and his speech ... is no more than a testimony, and one among
others, of the guarantee ofdelegation which is vested in him.5o
Since the source of judicial authority is none other than the question posed at the
outset of this paper, we find ourselves no better off if we must simply accept that
law's power derives from the authority of its judges. Bourdieu provides some
further analysis of the grounding of the authority of the perfonnative_ He claims
we cannot find the source of authority in language, but must sec language as
49 Denis Brion, 'The Ritual of the Judicial Opinion' in J Ralph Lindgren and Jay Knaack       
Ritual and Semiotics (1997).
50 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (J B Thompson, ed. Collection first published in
English translation 1991), 107.
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simply one cue to the authority delegated to the proper officia1. He goes on to
analyse the rituals performed by the official together with the speech acts which
contribute to the recognition of the delegation of authority. It is not language but
ritual, a thing outside language, which carries the authority of the perfonnative.
Winn has gone further to claim that 'what Austin called a "perfOlmative" is simply
what anthropologists have called a ritua1.,sl
There is a sense in which 'rimal' may be used in an iconoclastic sense to
suggest some ancient and irrational practices. While drawing attention to some of
the ways in which legal ritual draws on a type of reason which is not strictly
modern, and based in acts as much as words, there is no pejorative intent. Kertzer
has examined the many roles of rimal in modem political life, showing just how
pervasive its functions are in political transitions, legitimation, and other critical
moments. One important element of ritual is its own autonomy, which becomes a
source ofpower which can be shifted from its original delegate:
Yet once the rituals become established, they take on a life of their own in the
same way that culture itself has an existcnce that transcends the changing
collection of individuals who participate in it. The ritual legitimizes the power
and institutionalizes it, but at the same time the role of power holder itself
becomcs transfcrable, no longer the property of any particular individuaL Sl
In tracing the court's use of performatives through various procedural matters to a
final decision, we see thc means by which judicial authority is constituted in a
succession of rituals in the proper context. These performatives and rituals
constitute the institution ofthe court on each occasion that they are invoked.
The efficacy of judicial performarives derives from each of these
circumstances, in the right combination. While Austin emphasises the power of
language, he is not blind to the significance of context and authorisation. Bourdieu
emphasises the symbolic power of the authorised official, in this case the judge,
vvhile recognising other elements of the ritual which invokes that authority.
Kertzer's analysis of ritual indicates some of the ways in which each of its
elements combine to produce efficacious authority, through legitimacy and
transferability.
These conclusions may be applied to the characteristics of judicial authority
that have been discussed here. The requirements of perfornlative pov'ier, in
language, context and authorised personnel, explain much of the procedural
baggage of the triaL 1called this a 'curious surplus of procedure' since it exceeds
any prescriptions of procedural justice or discourse theory. Many ofthe elaborate
procedural devices employed by the judiciary and the legal profession in court do
little to ensure 'fairness' in any popular sense. lnstead they ensure legality. This is
done by founding the authority of the judge and the proper conduct of the tTia1 in a
range of traditional practices and legal reqUirements, many of which are not
codified, Jet alone 'rational' in a Weberian sense, The specific combination of
symbolic power, the context of place, set patterns of language and procedure can
all be identified as constituting ritual. This ritual, based in specific forms of legal
51 Pcwr Winn, "Legal Ritual' (1991) 2 Law and Critique 207, 213.
52 David Kertzer, Rilua[, Polilics, and Power (1988),51.
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reason (written and traditional), serves to constitute judicial aufuority in court, and
to ensure-its efficacy.
VI CONCLUSIONS
Judicial authority, in the sense of an assurance that judicial power will be
effective, has been seen to have several possible sources. The state is the guarantor
oflast resort: it will back judicial power with its monopoly on the legitimate use of
force. But the very legitimacy of this force, as of its own authority, must be
circumscribed within a framework set by the mle of law, hence by the judiciary.
While the judiciary relies on the force of the state, the state relies on the legitimacy
of the judiciary.
This distinction benveen the rule of force and the rule of law highlights the
formal appeal of the judiciary to 'the law'. We see this at several levels: in
rational, codified law; in the law of procedure; in procedural and discourse
theories of justice; and in the perfonnatives of courtroom ritual. Each of these
aspects of the law is interlinked, while each succeeding one is further from the
barc rational bones offonnallaw. Analysis oflaw usually confines itself to written
sources, which rarely discuss the actions by which the law is invoked, as it makes
its way from the codes to the courtroom. To the extentthat law in action in the
courtroom is subject to analysis, it is usually at the level ofprocedure. Yet we have
seen that formal analysis and codification of legal procedure only touch some
aspects of the rituals and performatives which bring the law to life in judicial
authority in court.
Popular sources of judicial authority weave in and out of this analysis. At one
level, judicial authority cannot be effective unless the people can be expected to
recognise and obey it. However, it is important to distinguish the authority of the
judiCiary, based in notions of rights and law, from the popular legitimacy of the
democratic legislature. The beliefs of the people are clearly a factor in the
acceptance of authority, though these are more complex than the data of public
opinion research, and must be sought at a deeper level of cultural life.
Since the decline ofthe usual consensual sources of substantive justice, idcas
ofprocedural justice constitute something ofa minimalclaim. We have seen in the
work of Habermas, Rawls and other philosophers some versions of the place of
procedure in justice claims and effective legal action. These theories themselves
may assist in the legitimation of judicial authority to the extent that people are
convinced that legal processes conform to ideal processes of communication or
procedural fairness. However, they may also provide a yardstick by,which law is
found lacking in its accessibility or communication, which could serve to
undern1ine judicial authority.
Some of the shortcomings of law's communicative and procedural methods
derive from ritual elements based in longstanding tradition and extreme fOl'malism.
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Rather than dismissing these as dysfunctional remnants of a past age, a study of
the place of the judge at the centre of courtroom ritual suggests a more important
and continuing role. Fonnal law is only brought out of abstraction into efficacy in
the world ofhuman afTairs by means of the judicial performative_ It is here that we
find the most fundamental level of judicial authority. The judge invokes the law
and is legitimised through it. At the same time, it is only through the authority of
the judge that the law is realised. The judge's authority is established not only by
the law itself, but also by the invocation of the correct fonn of words in the right
place at the right time. This procedmal or ritual foundation of judicial authority is
fundamental to its efficacy. Judicial authority, whatever else it may do under law
or in the interests of communicative competence, is fundamentally directed at
establishing itself through the performatives which institute the court on an
on-going basis, and which pronounce the final, binding decision.
This brings us back to the basic paradox of judicial authority. The
requirements of formal procedure, at the level of ritual, cut across the requirements
of discourse theory or procedural justice which suggest that decisions are only fair
to the extent that everyone participates equally, communicates clearly, and so on_
This demonstrates another of the limits of popular belief as a source of judicial
power. There remainsa scepticism as to whether judicial authority is consistent
with procedural fairness.
An optimistic program of procedural justice would suggest that judicial
procedures simply need to be brought into line with its prescriptions. Perhaps they
are not so far apan after all, and the interests of justice and of the parties are best
served by an open adversarial hearing, not unlike that of the common law court.53
With the decline of narratives about natural justice and a common moral purpose,
procedural justicc narratives have stepped in to explain, justify and evaluate
dominant decision-making processes in tenus of a universally fair procedure. The
argument runs that even if we cannot agree on outcomes, at least we can agree on
processes.
The limits to this program can be found, hO\vever, in the divergent sources of
legitimation required by the processes of law in court and of discourse in an ideal
speech situation. While law draws on consistency, codification and abstraction for
its justification, discourse theory seeks inclusive participation and a language
shared among the participants. The more weight procedure must bear in
legitimising judicial authority, the greater the tensions and higher the stakes
involved in reconciling discourse with law, and open debate with judicial
perforn1atives. Despite the apparent conflicts between these procedural styles
which! have described here, it is unclear from the present inquiry whether they
wiII turn out to be fundamentally incompatible.
53 This vieW is encountered among English-speaking philosophers eg Hampshire, above n 33, 53-54_
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